We consider the problem of computing approximate equilibria for non-cooperative twoplayer games. We provide a new algorithm with an improved additive approximation guaranty of 0.36392. The algorithm is based on solving an auxiliary zero-sum game. In contrast to the previously best known (0.38197+ )-approximation algorithm of Daskalakis, Meta and Papadimitriou, our method requires to solve only a single LP problem.
Introduction
A Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game is a pair of strategies, such that no player has an incentive to deviate (unilaterally). In a series of works [6, 3, 1] , it was established that computing a Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete even for two-player games. The focus has since then been on algorithms for approximate equilibria.
In this work we use the notion of additive approximation and consider the problem of computing approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. Under the usual assumption that the payoff matrices are normalized to be in [0, 1] n×n , we say that a pair of strategies is an -Nash equilibrium if no player can gain more than by unilaterally deviating to another strategy. In [2] it was proved that it is PPAD-complete to find an -Nash equilibrium with < 1 n c , for some constant c > 1. For constant however, the problem is still open. In [9] , it was shown that for any constant > 0, an -Nash equilibrium can be computed in subexponential time (n O(log n/ 2 ) ). As for polynomial time algorithms, it is straightforward to obtain a 3/4-approximation. See [7] for a slightly improved result. A simple 1/2-approximation was described in [4] . Recently, an improved approximation for = 3− √ 5 2 + ζ ≈ 0.38197 + ζ for any ζ > 0 was obtained by Daskalakis, Mehta and Papadimitriou [5] .
We provide two new algorithms for approximate Nash equilibria. The first one achieves exactly the same factor as [5] but with a simpler and faster technique. The second one, which is an extension of the first, achieves an improved approximation of 0.36392. Both algorithms are based on solving a single linear program in contrast to [5] which may require to solve up to is as follows: we first find an equilibrium (say x * , y * ) in the zero-sum game R − C, where R and C are the payoff matrices of the two players. If x * , y * is not a good solution for the original game, then the players take turns and switch to appropriate strategies, but only with a certain probability. The probability of switching for each player is set to be a function of the underlying parameters of the problem. The final part of the analysis then is to choose these functions so as to minimize the approximation error. The intuition behind using the auxiliary zero-sum game R − C is that a unilateral switch from x * , y * that improves the payoff of one player cannot hurt the other, as explained in the proof of Theorem 1.
Very recently, we have been informed by Spirakis and Tsaknakis [11] that they have obtained an algorithm achieving an improved approximation of 0.34. We are currently not aware of their technique and how it compares with ours.
Notation and Definitions
Consider a two person game G, where for simplicity the number of available (pure) strategies for each player is n. Our results still hold when the players do not have the same number of available strategies. We will refer to the two players as the row and the column player and we will denote their n × n payoff matrices by R, C respectively. Hence, if the row player chooses strategy i and the column player chooses strategy j, the payoffs are R ij and C ij respectively.
A mixed strategy for a player is a probability distribution over the set of his pure strategies and will be represented by a vector x = (x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n ) T , where x i ≥ 0 and x i = 1. Here x i is the probability that the player will choose his ith pure strategy. The ith pure strategy will be represented by the unit vector e i , that has 1 in the ith coordinate and 0 elsewhere. For a mixed strategy pair x, y, the payoff to the row player is the expected value of a random variable which is equal to R ij with probability x i y j . Therefore the payoff to the row player is x T Ry. Similarly the payoff to the column player is x T Cy.
A Nash equilibrium [10] is a pair of strategies x * , y * such that no player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally. Since mixed strategies are convex combinations of pure strategies, it suffices to consider only deviations to pure strategies: Definition 1 A pair of strategies x * , y * is a Nash equilibrium if:
(i) For every pure strategy e i of the row player, e T i Ry * ≤ (x * ) T Ry * , and
(ii) For every pure strategy e i of the column player,
Assuming that we normalize the entries of the payoff matrices so that they all lie in [0, 1], we can define the notion of an additive -approximate Nash equilibrium (or simply -Nash equilibrium) as follows:
Definition 2 For any > 0, a pair of strategies x * , y * is an -Nash equilibrium iff:
(i) For every pure strategy e i of the row player, e T i Ry * ≤ (x * ) T Ry * + , and
(ii) For every pure strategy e i of the column player, (x * ) T Ce i ≤ (x * ) T Cy * + .
In other words, no player will gain more than by unilaterally deviating to another strategy. A stronger notion of approximation was introduced in [6] , namely -well-supported equilibria. We do not consider this approximation concept here. See [8] for new results on well-supported equilibria.
3 A (
2 )-approximation
In this section, we provide an algorithm that achieves exactly the same factor as in [5] , which is 3 − √ 5/2, but by using a different and simpler technique. In the next section we show how to modify our algorithm in order to improve the approximation ratio.
Given a game G = (R, C), where the entries of R and C are in [0, 1], let A = R − C. Our algorithm is based on solving the zero-sum game (A, −A) and then modifying appropriately the solution, if it does not provide a good approximation. It is well known that zero-sum games can be solved efficiently using linear programming. The decision on when to modify the zero-sum solution depends on a parameter of the algorithm α ∈ [0, 1]. We first describe the algorithm parametrically and then show how to set the parameter appropriately so as to obtain the desired approximation.
Algorithm 1
Let α ∈ [0, 1] be a parameter of the algorithm.
1. Compute an equilibrium (x * , y * ) for the zero-sum game defined by the matrix A = R−C.
2. Let g 1 , g 2 be the incentive to deviate for the row and column player respectively if they play (x * , y * ) in the original game (R, C), i.e., g 1 = max i=1,...,n e T i Ry * − (x * ) T Ry * and g 2 = max i=1,...,n (x * ) T Ce i − (x * ) T Cy * . WLOG, assume, that g 1 ≥ g 2 (the statement of the algorithm would be completely symmetrical if g 1 < g 2 ).
3. Let r 1 ∈ argmax e i e T i Ry * be an optimal response of the row player to the strategy y * . Let b 2 ∈ argmax e i r T 1 Ce i be an optimal response of the column player to the strategy r 1 .
4. Output the following pair of strategies, (x,ŷ), depending on the value of g 1 with respect to the value of α:
Proof : If g 1 ≤ α (recall that we assumed g 1 ≥ g 2 ), then clearly (x * , y * ) is an α-approximate Nash equilibrium.
Suppose g 1 > α. We will estimate the satisfaction of each player separately. Suppose b 1 is an optimal response for the row player toŷ, i.e., b 1 ∈ argmax e i e T i Rŷ. The row player plays r 1 , which is a best response to y * . Hence b 1 can be better than r 1 only when the column player plays b 2 , which happens with probability δ 2 . Formally, the amount that the row player can earn by switching is at most:
The first inequality above comes from the fact that r 1 is a best response to y * and the second comes from our assumption that the entries of R and C are in [0, 1].
Consider the column player. The critical observation is that the column player also benefits (when he plays y * ) from the switch of the row player from x * to r 1 . In particular, since (x * , y * ) is an equilibrium for the zero-sum game (A, −A), the following inequalities hold:
If
But we know that r T 1 Ry * − (x * ) T Ry * = g 1 , which implies:
Now we will estimate the incentive of the column player to change his strategy. He playsŷ while he would preffer to play an optimal response tox which is b 2 . By switching he could earn:
The probability δ 2 was chosen so as to equalize the incentives of the two players to deviate in the case that g 1 > α. It is now easy to check that the function (1 − g 1 )/(2 − g 1 ) is decreasing, hence the incentive for both players to deviate is at most (1 − α)/(2 − α). Combined with the case when g 1 ≤ α, we get a max{α,
In order to optimize the approximation factor of Algorithm 1, we only need to equate the two terms, α and 1−α 2−α , which then gives:
≈ 0.38197. Since α is an irrational number, we need to ensure that we can still do the comparison g 1 ≤ α to be able to run Algorithm 1 (note that this is the only point where the algorithm uses the value of α). But to test g 1 ≤ 3 − √ 5/2, it suffices to test if (3 − 2g 1 ) 2 ≥ 5 and clearly g 1 is a polynomially sized rational number. Concerning complexity, zero-sum games can be solved in polynomial time by linear programming. All the other steps of the algorithm require only polynomial time. Therefore, Theorem 1 implies:
Corollary 2 We can compute in polynomial time a 
An Improved Approximation
In this section we obtain a better approximation of 1/2 − 1/3 √ 6 ≈ 0.36392 by essentially proposing a different solution in the cases where Algorithm 1 approaches its worst case guarantee. We first give some motivation for the new algorithm. From the analysis of Algorithm 1, one can easily check that as long as g 1 belongs to [0, 1/3] ∪ [1/2, 1], we can have a 1/3-approximation if we run the algorithm with any α ∈ [1/3, 1/2]. Therefore, the bottleneck for going beyond
is when the incentive for the row player is in [1/3, 1/2]. In this case, we will change the algorithm so that the row player will play a mix of r 1 and x * . Note that in Algorithm 1, the probability of playing r 1 is either 0 or 1 depending on the value of g 1 . This probability will now be a more complicated function of g 1 , derived from a certain optimization problem. As for the column player, we will again compute b 2 which will now be the best response to the mixture of r 1 and x * and not just r 1 and we will compute an appropriate mixture of b 2 and y * . Again, the probability of playing b 2 is chosen so as to equate the incentives of the two players to defect. Finally we should note that our modification will be not on [1/3, 1/2] but instead on a subinterval of the form [1/3, β], where β is derived from the optimization that we perform in our analysis.
Algorithm 2
2. As in Algorithm 1, let g 1 , g 2 be the incentive to deviate for the row and column player respectively if they play (x * , y * ) in the original game, i.e., g 1 = max i=1,...,n e T i Ry * − (x * ) T Ry * and g 2 = max i=1,...,n (x * ) T Ce i − (x * ) T Cy * . WLOG, assume, that g 1 ≥ g 2 .
3. Let r 1 ∈ argmax e i e T i Ry * be an optimal response of the row player to the strategy y * .
4. The row player will play a mixture of r 1 and x * , where the probability of playing r 1 is given by:
where
5. Let b 2 be an optimal response of the column player to
e., the gain from switching to b 2 if the row player plays x * .
6. The column player will play a mixture of b 2 and y * , where the probability of playing b 2 is given by:
In our analysis, we will take β to be the solution to ∆ 1 (g 1 ) = 1 in [1/3, 1/2], which coincides with the root of the polynomial x 3 − x 2 − 2x + 1 in that interval and it is:
Calculations show that 0.445041 ≤ β ≤ 0.445042. The emergence of β in our analysis is explained in Lemma 3.
Remark 1
The actual probabilities δ 1 and δ 2 as well as the number β can be irrational numbers. However, for any constant > 0, we can take approximations of high enough accuracy of all the square roots that are involved in the calculations so that the final loss in the approximation ratio will be at most . From now on, for ease of exposition, we will carry out the analysis of Algorithm 2, as if we can compute exactly all the expressions involved.
Note that for g 1 ∈ [ 
Now we bound the incentives of players to deviate. Let F be the following function:
Lemma 4 The pair of strategies (x,ŷ) is a λ-Nash equilibrium for game (R, C) with
Proof : In the case that g 1 ∈ [0, 1/3]∪[β, 1], the answer follows from the proof of Theorem 1. The interesting case is when
Case 1: g 1 ≤ 1/3. (x,ŷ) = (x * , y * ) which is by definition a g 1 -approximate Nash equilibrium.
Case 2a:
Recall that Lemma 3 impliesx is a valid strategy in Case 2. Observe, that
is a valid probability, and thereforeŷ is a valid mixed strategy too.
We estimate the incentive for the row player to deviate fromx. If b 1 is an optimal response tô y, then the gain from switching is at most:
Also r 1 is a best response to y * , hence (b 1 − r 1 ) T Ry * ≤ 0 and (b 1 − x * ) T Ry * ≤ g 1 . Therefore, the gain from deviating is at most: b
We now estimate the incentive of the column player to switch. The best response tox for the column player is b 2 , which is played with probability δ 2 . Thus the incentive to deviate fromŷ is:x
The last inequality follows from the definitions of g 1 and h 2 . It remains to observe that our choice of δ 2 (δ 1 , g 1 , h 2 ) =
makes these estimates both equal to F (δ 1 , g 1 , h 2 ):
Case 2b: g 1 ∈ (1/3, β] and ∆ 2 (δ 1 , g 1 , h 2 ) < 0. Thenŷ = y * and the best response of the row player is r 1 . Hence he can improve his payoff by at most
while the column player can improve by at most
By (1) we can see that r T 1 Cy * ≥ g 1 . Hencê
It is easy to check that ∆ 2 (g 1 , δ 1 , h 2 ) < 0 implies δ 1 (1 − g1) + (1 − δ 1 )h 2 < (1 − δ 1 )g 1 . Therefore the maximum incentive to deviate in this case is at most (1 − δ 1 )g 1 . Combining Case 2a and Case 2b, and taking the worst possible case over the range of h 2 (recall that h 2 ≤ g 2 ≤ g 1 ), we get precisely the expression in the statement of Lemma 4.
Notice that in this case, the players are playing the same strategies as in Algorithm 1, when g 1 ≥ α. By the analysis in the proof of Theorem 1, we see that the maximum incentive is
We will now argue that our choice of ∆ 1 (g 1 ) is optimal for any g 1 ∈ ( 1 3 , β) and that the expression (6) from Lemma 4 achieves an improvement over Algorithm 1. For this, we need to look at the optima of the following function:
is an optimal solution for the expression P (g 1 ).
Furthermore, the maximum of P (g 1 ) over g 1 is
, i.e., the following holds
max
,β]
The lemma will be proved in Section 5. We are now ready to conclude with the following:
Theorem 6 For any > 0, Algorithm 2 computes a (0.36392 + )-approximate Nash equilibrium.
Proof :
By Lemma 4 the output of Algorithm 2, (x,ŷ) is a pair of mixed strategies for players, such that the incentive of players to deviate is bounded by (6) . By Lemma 5 we have that for g 1 ∈ (1/3, β) the expression (6) is bounded by Figure ? ?. 
Proof of Lemma 3 and Lemma 5
Proof of Lemma 3 :
, where ∆ 1 (see Algorithm 2) is defined as
It is easy to check that ∆ 1 (1/3) = 0. We will show that ∆ 1 is real-valued and monotone increasing on the interval [1/3, 1/2). Then we show that 1/3 < β < 1/2, and ∆ 1 (β) = 1.
To check that ∆ 1 (g 1 ) takes real values on [1/3, 1/2), it is easy to verify that the radicand, i.e., the expression under the square root, is nonnegative in this domain.
To check the monotonicity of ∆ 1 (g 1 ), we calculate ∆ 1 (g 1 ) and find
The inequality in (11) is obtained as follows: Inequality (10) shows that the radicand in (11) is strictly positive on [1/3, 1/2). So the denominator appearing in ∆ 1 (g 1 ) is real and positive. For the numerator appearing in ∆ 1 (g 1 ) the following estimation holds for all g 1 ∈ [1/3, 1/2):
Here the first inequality holds since g 1 ∈ [1/3, 1/2) implies (1 − g 1 )(4g 1 + 1) > 0. This proves (11) showing that ∆ 1 is strictly increasing on the interval [1/3, 1/2). Now we calculate g ∈ [1/3, 1/2) for which ∆ 1 (g) = 1 holds. In the following let x ∈ [1/3, 1/2). This implies 0 < 2 − x and 0 < 1 − x, which together with (10) gives rise to the second equivalence in the following: 
where the last term is zero for t = 3 √ 3. Resubstitution shows that p(β) = 0 holds for
Taylor expansion of the corresponding terms leads to 0.445042 < β < 0.445043, proving β ∈ [1/3, 1/2). This shows ∆ 1 (β) = 1, which proves the lemma.
2
Fact 7
The square function is monotone increasing on the positive domain, i.e.,
Proof of Lemma 5 : For the definition of the function F see (5), for ∆ 1 see Algorithm 2. Combining (13) and (14) from Lemma 8 we obtain
For ease of exposition, we drop the subscripts of the variables from now on. Hence we are left to prove max g∈[
≤ 0.36392 where
It is easy to check that (10) implies that the radicand g(1 − 2g)(−1 + 4g − 2g 2 ) is nonnegative for all g ∈ [1/3, β]. We now prove that the maximum of F (∆(g), g, g) on [
, β] is assumed in 1/ √ 6 : Straight forward calculation leads to
Fixing g ∈ [1/3, β] (arbitrarily), one finds:
Here ( * ) and ( * * ) are implied by the choice of g,
The inequalities in ( * ) and ( * * ) together with (12) lead to the equivalence
Here the second inequality holds for the chosen g, since the term can be reformulated as shown under the brace, where (3 − g) > 0 holds by the restriction g ∈ [1/3, β].
Thus we showed
, proving the lemma, since g ∈ [1/3, β] was chosen arbitrarily and 1/ √ 6 ∈ [1/3, β] is implied by 0.40 ≤ 1/ √ 6 ≤ 0.41 < β. 
Additional lemmas
and prove it as follows: Brief calculation together with (1 − g) > 0 lead to ∆ 2 (δ, g, g) = (1 − g)δ/(1 − g + δ) ≥ 0. So there is a h * ∈ [0, g], namely h * := g, such that ∆ 2 (δ, g, h * ) ≥ 0. This implies the first inequality in (15).
Observe that to prove the second inequality in (15), it suffices to show that F (δ, g, g) ≥ (1 − δ)g and F (δ, g, g) ≥ F (δ, g, h) for all h ∈ [0, g]
both hold -independently of the value of ∆ 2 . Quick calculation proves the first inequality of (16): Recall that the choice on (g, δ) implies (1 − g) ≥ 0, 2δg ≥ 0, and (1 − 2g) ≥ 0, yielding
To obtain the second inequality of (16), we show that for the chosen δ, g, the function F (δ, g, h) is monotone non-decreasing on h ∈ [0, g]: Recalling h ≤ g ≤ 1/2 we find (1 − 2h) ≥ 0, implying
This finally proves (16), and thus the second inequality in (15), concluding the proof of (13).
To prove (14) fix some d ∈ [0, 1] arbitrarily and define p(g) := g(1 − 2g)(−1 + 4g − 2g 2 ), which is the radicand appearing in F (∆ 1 (g), g, g). Brief calculation leads to 
